Category Archives Judge Jackson

She needed new tires.  So she went to a Bridgestone tire shop. She was charged a “shop supplies fee” of $1.20, which appeared on the itemized initial estimate, as well as the final invoice. A sign posted in the store explained the purpose of this "shop supplies fee": TO OUR CUSTOMERS: A variety of shop supplies are consumed in servicing our customer's vehicles. Parts and labor necessary for servicing customer's vehicles are itemized on estimates and invoices. However, shop supplies (such as protective items for your vehicle, solvents, cleaners, rags, etc.) do not lend themselves to precise itemization. Therefore, on invoices greater than $30, an additional charge of 6% of the total labor amount, not to exceed $25 will be added to your invoice. This charge represents costs and profits.  Non-mandated disposal or recycling charges may also represent costs and profits. A lawsuit ensued.  Plaintiff sought certification of a class…

Cy pres - A French term for "ok, close enough" - can be tricky. The wrong has been righted, but either the class has been fully compensated, or the compensation is too de minimis or impractical to allocate and distribute. What to do? Give it away to charity, but not just any charity. This issue confronted the Court in In re Bank of America Corp. Sec. Litig., 2013 WL 3212514 (E.D. Mo., June 24, 2013). In that securities fraud MDL, the global settlement of $490,000,000.00 had been approved, and all class members had been paid. Yet, due to problems locating class members, duplicate payments, restitution, and interest, class counsel found themselves with $2,734,136.69 remaining in the kitty. This was even after the claim administrator had been caught embezzling $5,000,000.00 from the fund. Not a bad problem to have, but a problem nonetheless. After rejecting the motion of the claims administrator…

In Grant v. Convergys Corp., 2013 WL 781898 (E.D. Mo., March 1, 2013), Judge Jackson declined to enforce a class action waiver contained in an employment application because it eliminated the employees' right to engage in collective and class litigation, which is protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA. In this case, the plaintiff sought to prosecute an FLSA collective action and a MMWL claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The Defendant moved to strike the class allegations based on the following language contained in the putative class representative's employment application: I further agree that I will pursue any claim or lawsuit relating to my employment with Con-vergys (or any of its subsidiaries or related enti-ties) as an individual, and will not lead, join, or serve as a member of a class or group of persons bringing such a claim or lawsuit. Prior to filing this suit,…

In an interesting order, Judge Jackson granted defendant Office Depot’s motion to dismiss the class allegations in a putative class action brought under the TCPA, 42 U.S.C. § 227, alleging the transmission of unsolicited faxes.  Judge Jackson shrugged aside Plaintiff Lindsay Transmission’s protest that the motion to dismiss prior to class discovery was premature, citing Rule 23(c)(1)(A)’s directive to determine the propriety of class certification “at an early practicable time.”   This is of course consistent with the increasing number of courts that have expressed a willingness to dismiss class allegations at an early stage, and the Court may well have been influenced by Office Depot’s affidavit explaining that Lindsay Transmission’s initial nationwide discovery requests would have required more than 2,000 manager hours to interview 1,132 store managers in 1,111 retail stores, a truly expensive fishing expedition. Instead, the District Court mooted the onerous discovery requests by striking the class allegations…

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